Concealed Carry Rights Don’t End at State Lines

TL;DR:

Congress keeps floating national reciprocity bills to "fix" the patchwork of concealed carry laws. Yet, the constitutional logic is straightforward: Bruen established that 'shall issue' permitting is the constitutional minimum. And as far as reciprocity goes, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from discriminating against non-residents and denying constitutional rights based on residency. Therefore, nationwide reciprocity already exists—we just need courts to enforce it. This article argues that reciprocity legislation is both practically unavailing and constitutionally unnecessary. 

Constitutional Rights Don't Stop at State Lines:

Imagine you're a rabbi from Missouri visiting Delaware for a family wedding. You arrive at the venue wearing your kippa, only to be told: "Sorry, Delaware doesn't have reciprocity with Missouri for religious exercise. You'll need to remove that or face criminal charges."

Absurd? Absolutely. Unconstitutional? Obviously.

Now imagine you're being prosecuted in California and the prosecution's star witness resides in Texas. To avoid the inconvenience of bringing him to California, the court allows the case to proceed using only his recorded statements. Your attorney objects on Confrontation Clause grounds but the court overrules, stating California doesn't have the same stringent requirements as other states.

Again, constitutional nonsense that no court would tolerate for a second.

One more: You're driving from Kansas to visit family in New York. At the border, state police stop you, order you out of your vehicle, and begin ripping out the panels of your car and searching it. When you ask why, they inform you: "We don't have the same search and seizure restrictions as Kansas, so we stop and search every out of state vehicle. State policy."

Every constitutional lawyer in America would be drafting emergency injunctions before the ink was dry.

So why do we accept this? 'Sorry, we don't recognize Missouri concealed carry permits here. California has stricter Second Amendment standards. You'll need to disarm or face criminal charges.'

The False Promise of Legislative Solutions:

H.R. 38 recently passed the House Judiciary Committee, promising to solve interstate carry problems through federal legislation. But the bill's actual language reveals a more limited—and more troubling—approach. Rather than requiring universal recognition, H.R. 38 only extends reciprocity to those who possess a valid license when visiting a state that either doesn't restrict carrying at all or has its own concealed carry program. This creates a two-class system where your constitutional rights depend entirely on your state of residence and current presence—exactly backwards from how constitutional rights should work.

The real issue isn't that we need Congress to grant reciprocity rights—it's that states are violating existing constitutional protections. H.R. 38 makes this worse by codifying a two-class system of constitutional rights. If you're a resident of a constitutional carry state, you obviously have the broadest rights overall, but are swiftly stripped of those rights once you step foot in the wrong state. For the states that serve as de facto 'may issue' regimes despite Supreme Court guidance to the contrary, they remain free to do so with impunity until the Court grants cert on that precise practice. This approach treats constitutional rights as legislative privileges, flipping the constitutional burden: states should prove they can restrict, not Congress prove they can allow.

Post-Bruen, reciprocity is the constitutional minimum, not the political maximum. We don't need permission to exercise rights.

The Constitutional Floor After Bruen:

Bruen fundamentally changed the Second Amendment landscape by establishing that the right to bear arms receives the same constitutional protection as other enumerated rights. Rather than rehash the entire framework here, I've previously written extensively about Bruen's methodology and what it means for gun rights generally. See my detailed breakdown of the Bruen decision here and my analysis of how Bruen affects existing gun laws here.

The Key Takeaway: Bruen established that 'shall issue' represents the constitutional minimum—states can no longer deny permits based on subjective 'special need' standards, though they may maintain objective licensing requirements. As Justice Kavanaugh's concurrence made clear: "the 43 States that employ objective shall-issue licensing regimes for carrying handguns for self-defense may continue to do so," but the six 'may issue' states must abandon their discretionary systems. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 80 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). The government must prove historical tradition rooted in 1791-1868 for any restriction on conduct covered by the Second Amendment's plain text.

Most importantly for this discussion, Bruen explicitly confirmed that the right to bear arms includes the right to carry 'in the clothing or in a pocket'—the very definition of concealed carry. As the Court explained:

"Nothing in the Second Amendment's text draws a home/public distinction with respect to the right to keep and bear arms... Heller further confirmed that the right to 'bear arms' refers to the right to 'wear, bear, or carry . . . upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose . . . of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another person.'"

Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008)).

There is no constitutional distinction between concealed ("in the clothing or in a pocket") and open ("upon the person") carry; both are protected exercises of the same fundamental right.

This means the rights already exist. The Second Amendment protects carry rights directly—including concealed carry—the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state denial of federal constitutional rights, and no Congressional action is required to activate these existing constitutional protections.

The Constitutional Hierarchy Problem:

Congress Can't Grant What the Constitution Already Protects:

Reciprocity bills treat constitutional rights as Congressional privileges, fundamentally flipping the constitutional burden. As the Bruen Court emphasized: "The Second Amendment 'is the very product of an interest balancing by the people,' and it 'surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms' for self-defense." Id. at 17. When Congress steps in to 'grant' what the Constitution already protects, it creates a dangerous precedent that constitutional rights need legislative activation.

The "Permission Slip" Paradigm:

Post-Bruen, the permit-centric model is constitutionally suspect. The Court made clear that constitutional rights don't require government permission: "We know of no other constitutional right that an individual may exercise only after demonstrating to government officers some special need." Id. at 70. Reciprocity bills validate the worst aspects of may-issue (either in name or in effect) regimes by accepting that constitutional rights require government permission slips.

The Reciprocity Trap:

It Assumes States Can Deny Constitutional Rights:

H.R. 38 creates a system that lets constitutional violators off the hook while primarily harming their own residents. The bill protects permit holders and applies in any state that has "a statute under which residents of the State may apply for a license or permit to carry a concealed firearm" or "do[es] not prohibit the carrying of concealed firearms by residents of the State for lawful purposes".

This creates perverse incentives, cementing the constitutional divide between compliant states and those that continue to defy Bruen:

• First, it only helps visitors who already have permits from their home states. A New York resident denied a permit by New York's amorphous 'good moral character' standard gets no help from H.R. 38 anywhere in the country—he has no permit to reciprocate. This leaves countless law-abiding citizens in states with unconstitutional "may-issue" regimes disarmed, regardless of whether they cross state lines.
• Second, the most restrictive states face no pressure to change their facially unconstitutional systems. States that openly defy Bruen by maintaining subjective 'good moral character' determinations, requiring permits to possess firearms in the home, or imposing restrictions on the "time, place, manner, and circumstances" of concealed carry remain free to do so. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 26200 (time, place, manner, and circumstances restrictions); N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00 (maintaining permits for home possession and subjective character requirements).

The constitutional violation thus becomes primarily an internal problem—residents of restrictive states suffer under unconstitutional restrictions while out-of-state visitors with permits get 'reciprocity' of a right that merely exists on paper. H.R. 38 actually helps these states by letting them claim they provide 'reciprocity' while continuing to violate their own residents' constitutional rights.

This validates a broken system where constitutional rights depend on residency, effectively codifying a two-class system: those whose rights are nominally recognized due to an out-of-state permit, and those whose rights are entirely denied by their home state's unconstitutional regime. The absurd result: A Texas resident with a valid permit gets more rights in New York than a New York resident. 

Moreover, the reasonably foreseeable result of this system is that permit holders with the brazenness to travel through those restrictive states may swiftly see that ‘reciprocity’ dissolve due to restrictions beyond the mere issuance of a permit. While they may have their permit ‘recognized,’ those dubious “time, place, manner, and circumstances” or “sensitive places” restrictions (which amount to an effective ban on concealed carry given their breadth, opacity, and subjectivity) could easily lead to disarmament or incarceration for our lawful but naïve travelers. Much like with local residents, carry rights merely exist on paper for these travelers until the Bruen-defiant states are brought into full compliance with modern Second Amendment jurisprudence.

H.R. 38 doesn't solve the patchwork problem—it codifies it by creating a two-class system where your constitutional rights depend on which state issued your driver's license and where you’re traveling. This turns federalism on its head and creates exactly the kind of arbitrary discrimination based on residency that constitutional principles prohibit. Under a proper constitutional analysis post-Bruen, your rights shouldn't depend on legislative grace from either your home state or your destination state—they should depend on the Constitution itself.

Constitutional Resistance in Action:

The problem with legislative solutions becomes clear when we see how states are responding to Bruen. Rather than genuine compliance, we're seeing constitutional resistance masquerading as reform. Several states have comparable laws on the books and, more importantly, policies in practice that continue to defy the Court's holding.

These states aren't operating in good faith. They're engaged in deliberate constitutional nullification, finding every possible way to undermine Bruen's holding while technically claiming compliance, taking advantage of judicial ennui regarding the Second Amendment. H.R. 38 won't solve this problem—it will legitimize it by creating workarounds that let these states continue violating their residents' rights while offering token reciprocity to visitors.

The Federalist Framework: Rights Beyond Congressional Reach:

The Article IV Foundation: Privileges and Immunities:

The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 provides that "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." This isn't a suggestion—it's a constitutional command that forms the bedrock of our federal system.

The Supreme Court has consistently held that this clause prevents states from discriminating against out-of-state citizens regarding rights "bearing on the vitality of the Nation as a single entity" and those "sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the Nation." Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 279 (1985).

What This Means in Practice:

When a Missouri citizen travels to Delaware, they don't lose their constitutional rights at the state line. They remain entitled to free speech protections, religious exercise rights, due process protections, and equal protection guarantees. The constitutional floor applies everywhere, regardless of local political preferences.

The Fourteenth Amendment Reinforcement:

The Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause reinforces this principle by protecting the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" from state interference. As Justice Thomas noted in McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), this clause was specifically designed to prevent states from denying fundamental constitutional rights—including Second Amendment rights—to any American citizen.

Combined with the Equal Protection Clause, the message is clear: states cannot create different tiers of constitutional protection based on residency. A right that's fundamental enough to be protected by the Constitution is fundamental enough to be respected everywhere in America.

Why Administrative Convenience Isn't a Constitutional Defense:

Before Bruen, courts in cases like Culp v. Raoul, 921 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2019) and Peterson v. LaCabe, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (D. Colo. 2011) accepted state arguments that 'information deficits' and 'monitoring difficulties' justified denying constitutional rights to out-of-state visitors. These courts essentially held that if it's administratively inconvenient for a state to verify someone's background, the state can simply deny their constitutional rights.

Post-Bruen, this analysis is explicitly forbidden. The Supreme Court held that judges cannot "make difficult empirical judgments about the costs and benefits of firearms restrictions" and that judicial deference to "legislative interest balancing" is "not deference that the Constitution demands." Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17. The Court emphasized that the Second Amendment "is the very product of an interest balancing by the people." Id.

"It is this balance—struck by the traditions of the American people—that demands our unqualified deference." Id.

This reasoning would never survive if applied to any other constitutional right. Imagine the same logic applied elsewhere:

• Right to Assembly: 'We can't monitor out-of-state protest groups like we can our own residents, so Missouri visitors are prohibited from forming any public gatherings.'
• Speedy Trial: 'We have greater information on our residents which allows us to process their cases more quickly, so Texas residents don't get speedy trial protections here.'

Every other instance like these would be recognized immediately as constitutional nonsense, we've just allowed a fictitious carveout for the Second Amendment (making it a second-class right) prior to Bruen. Constitutional rights aren't subject to cost-benefit analysis or governmental convenience—they're supposed to be inconvenient roadblocks to government power.

The Judge Manion Standard: Rights Over Convenience:

Fortunately, at least one federal judge got it right pre-Bruen. In his dissent in Culp v. Raoul, Judge Manion of the Seventh Circuit demolished the majority's deference to administrative burden:

"The Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency"; simply avoiding cost and administrative burden does not justify denying constitutional rights.

Culp v. Raoul, 921 F.3d 646, 670 (7th Cir. 2019) (Manion, J., dissenting).

Judge Manion recognized what should be obvious: you can't balance away constitutional rights because they're hard to implement. Bruen vindicated Judge Manion's approach and rejected the interest balancing framework.

Post-Bruen: The Constitutional Floor Applies Everywhere:

Bruen established that Second Amendment rights are subject to the same constitutional protections as other enumerated rights. States must now prove historical justification for any restriction, and administrative convenience isn't historically grounded.

Under Bruen's framework, if carry rights are constitutionally protected in Missouri (which they are), they're constitutionally protected everywhere. Period.

Rights Are Universal, Not Negotiable:

The genius of our constitutional system is that certain rights are beyond the reach of local political majorities. Whether 51% or 99% of Californians oppose Second Amendment rights is irrelevant—constitutional rights aren't subject to popular vote.

This distinction reflects a deeper principle: the difference between negative and positive rights. The Constitution doesn't grant rights—it protects them from government interference. The Second Amendment doesn't force anyone to own guns; it prevents the government from stopping those who choose to.

The predictable retort from those who oppose Second Amendment rights is often, "Guns kill people, speech doesn't." This argument fundamentally misses the point about how we treat any enumerated right. We don't penalize a right itself; we penalize its unlawful expression.

Consider the First Amendment's protection of religious exercise: the Supreme Court, in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) upheld a generally applicable ban on peyote ingestion, even when religiously motivated, without banning the Native American Church itself. The Court recognized Oregon was penalizing a specific act, not the right to religious belief. 

Similarly, the First Amendment protects speech, but it doesn't protect defamation, incitement to violence, true threats, or fighting words. We impose civil and criminal penalties for these unlawful expressions, not because speech itself is inherently dangerous, but because its misuse can cause profound harm—from destroyed reputations and emotional distress to, in the case of incitement or threats, proximate physical harm and death. 

Likewise, the Second Amendment protects the right to bear arms, but it does not protect murder, armed robbery, or assault with a deadly weapon. These are criminal acts, not protected exercises of a right. The difference in public contention around firearms versus speech is largely due to the sensationalizing-prone impact of guns, but the underlying constitutional principle of penalizing the abuse of a right, not its mere existence, remains identical.

If the majority of Californians genuinely believe guns are dangerous or just not worth having, they're free to act on that belief by choosing not to own firearms, not to visit gun stores, not to associate with gun owners. What they cannot do is use government force to impose their preferences on others—especially visitors from other states who hold different views. Constitutionally speaking, this approach is as backwards as getting shoved in a mosh pit at a metal concert and then demanding all concerts be banned.

Constitutional rights either mean something everywhere, or they mean nothing anywhere. There's no middle ground that preserves constitutional government.

The Enforcement Problem, Not the Authorization Problem:

What's Actually Needed:

The solution isn't new federal legislation creating workarounds—it's robust court challenges to permit schemes under Bruen. Citizens must demand constitutional compliance, not legislative compromise. States must be forced to prove historical justification for these restrictions or abandon them.

Why Compromise Solutions Make Things Worse:

Reciprocity legislation legitimizes the permit paradigm, reduces pressure for real constitutional compliance, creates political cover for continued violations, and makes comprehensive constitutional recognition harder to achieve.

As the Bruen Court noted about 'sensitive places,' the constitutional framework already provides tools for addressing legitimate concerns. The Court acknowledged that certain locations—"legislative assemblies, polling places, and courthouses"—were historically recognized as places "where weapons were altogether prohibited." Bruen, 597 U.S. at 21. But it rejected New York's attempt to expand this concept, noting that "expanding the category of 'sensitive places' simply to all places of public congregation that are not isolated from law enforcement defines the category of 'sensitive places' far too broadly." Id. at 22.

Conclusion: Bruen Lit the Fire—Time to Hold States to It:

The Path Forward:

Federal legislation isn't a fix—it's a distraction. The rights already exist and courts must enforce them. As Justice Kavanaugh's concurrence made clear, states can maintain licensing systems, but they must employ "objective licensing requirements" rather than subjective "special need" standards. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 80 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

Beyond Reciprocity: Full Constitutional Recognition:

Reciprocity represents the bare minimum, not the goal. True constitutional compliance means permitless carry (or at least a streamlined and objective 'shall issue' regime to screen for prohibited possessors) with historically justified exceptions. The constitutional right to bear arms in public for self-defense is not "a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees." McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010) (plurality opinion).

What we should do:

Demand enforcement of existing rights, not creation of new legislative privileges. We don't need permission to exercise rights—we need courts to stop letting states pretend we do.

Contact Us:

If you have questions about the topics addressed in this article or another Second Amendment matter, contact Wood Law Offices, PLLC through our website or by phone.

Disclaimer:

This blog post is for general informational purposes only and should not be construed as legal advice. The opinions expressed are solely those of the author. This content is considered attorney advertising and does not establish an attorney-client relationship. For specific legal advice tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney licensed in your jurisdiction.

Sources, For the Curious (or Skeptical):

• U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2
• U.S. Const. amend. I
• U.S. Const. amend. IV
• U.S. Const. amend. VI
• U.S. Const. amend. XIV
• Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
• District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)
• McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010)
• New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022)
• Culp v. Raoul, 921 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2019)
• Cal. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 745 F. Supp. 3d 1037 (C.D. Cal. 2024)
• Peterson v. LaCabe, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (D. Colo. 2011)
• Cal. Penal Code § 26200 (2025)
• N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00 (2025)
• H.R. 38, 119th Cong. (2025) (reported by H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 25, 2025)

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